

Prudential Standard CPS 511 Remuneration (CPS 511)

Annual Remuneration Disclosure

For year ended 30 June 2025

IOOF Investment Management Limited
NULIS Nominees (Australia) Limited
OnePath Custodians Pty Limited
Oasis Fund Management Limited



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Introduction

This disclosure, made in accordance with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority's (APRA) *Prudential Standard CPS 511 Remuneration* (CPS 511), outlines the remuneration framework, practices, and outcomes for the following Registrable Superannuation Entity (RSE) licensees within the Insignia Financial Ltd (IFL) group (the IFL Group) for the financial year ending 30 June 2025:

- IOOF Investment Management Limited
- NULIS Nominees (Australia) Limited
- OnePath Custodians Pty Limited
- Oasis Fund Management Limited

Each entity is considered a Significant Financial Institution (SFI) for the purposes of CPS 511.

As these RSE licensees operate under common ownership and governance within the IFL Group, APRA has confirmed that they may present their disclosures in a single consolidated document, provided that the quantitative tables are presented separately for each RSE licensee. This combined disclosure therefore provides:

- Groupwide context describing the overarching remuneration governance and risk management framework that applies consistently across the RSE licensees; and
- Entity specific quantitative tables for each RSE licensee.

Qualitative Disclosure

1. Remuneration Governance and Risk Management

1.1 The RSE licensees' role in governing remuneration

Remuneration plays an important role in delivering business outcomes and enabling a high-performance culture. The IFL Group has a comprehensive remuneration framework which ensures that the design and oversight of our practices support the delivery of strategic objectives by rewarding collective and individual performance. In addition, it recognises constructive behaviours that drive strong risk outcomes, while ensuring that remuneration outcomes do not reward behaviours inconsistent with risk management principles, compliance, conduct expectations, and the best interest of members.

All four RSE Licensees within the IFL Group have adopted, and consistently apply, the IFL Group's remuneration framework which includes the IFL Group Remuneration Policy, and the Group People and Remuneration Committee (GPRC).

The Board of each RSE licensee (RSEL Board) has adopted the GPRC as its remuneration committee. The GPRC is the governing body for monitoring overall pay across the IFL Group, as well as developing, monitoring, and assessing the remuneration strategy, framework, policies and practices. The responsibilities of the GPRC are outlined in the GPRC Terms of Reference. The Terms of Reference are available on the Corporate Governance page of IFL's website at <https://www.insigniafinancial.com.au/corporate-responsibility/corporate-governance/statement-charters-and-policies>.

The RSEL Boards oversee remuneration outcomes as they relate to the relevant RSE licensees' business operations, to support behaviours that protect the best financial interests of members. The RSEL Boards and IFL Board each retain discretion to adjust or eliminate variable remuneration, for relevant employees, in response to misconduct, risk management failures, regulatory breaches, underperformance or non-compliance with conduct and regulatory standards.

The RSEL Boards also receive relevant reporting and information from the GPRC, the Risk & Compliance Committee, the Risk & Conduct Forum (on material risk-related matters) and the Chief Risk Officer to ensure that the risk outcomes are appropriately reflected in remuneration outcomes. The Risk & Conduct Forum is a separate management committee that assesses material risk-related matters and recommends individual consequences, including remuneration adjustments for senior and APRA-specified roles, to the GPRC to ensure outcomes reflect a holistic view of risk, conduct and performance.

The RSEL Boards' representatives also take part in a joint meeting with the IFL Group People & Remuneration Committee, Group Risk and Compliance Committee (GRCC), and Group Audit Committee (GAC), as part of IFL's end of year performance and remuneration review process. In FY25, the joint Committee meeting was extended to include the Chairs of the RSEL Boards, Risk and Compliance and Audit Committees to provide the RSELs' perspective to the discussion. Consistent with CPS 511, the RSEL Boards' oversight and any actions arising from this meeting relate specifically to relevant employees who perform significant services for the RSE licensees. The joint meeting reviewed the material risk-related matters and considered potential consequences on performance and remuneration outcomes for those relevant employees and other individuals within scope of the RSE licensees' remuneration framework.

1.2 Remuneration governance framework

During the financial year ended 30 June 2025, the following meetings were held:

- NULIS Nominees (Australia) Limited Board: 12 meetings
- IOOF Investment Management Ltd (IIML) Board: 12 meetings
- OnePath Custodians Pty Limited (OPC) Board: 14 meetings
- Oasis Fund Management Limited (OFM) Board: 12 meetings
- Group People & Remuneration Committee (GPRC): 10 meetings (including a joint meeting between the GPRC, the GRCC and GAC)
- IFL Board: 32 meetings

1.3 Ongoing review of the remuneration framework

In FY25, IFL undertook a targeted uplift of its remuneration governance and strategy. This included updates to the Group Remuneration Policy, enhancements to the executive remuneration structure, and the implementation of a revised executive remuneration framework effective 1 July 2024.

The updated Group Remuneration Policy applies to all IFL employees, including employees that provide services to RSE licensees. These enhancements were informed by the October 2024 GIA review 'Group Internal Audit Report – CPS 511 Remuneration Implementation: Consequence Management Framework'.

Effective 1 July 2024, the revised executive remuneration structure was implemented following a review initiated by the GPRC and supported by EY as external remuneration consultants. The review was driven by significant business changes, including a new operating model and the implementation of the *Financial Accountability Regime Act 2023* (FAR).

The resulting framework maintains the core principles of the FY24 Executive Incentive Plan (EIP) while balancing regulatory compliance, short-term and long-term performance, sustainable value creation and appropriate risk-adjusted outcomes. The framework applies to all Executives in FY25 except the IFL Group CEO, whose FY25 remuneration structure remains on the FY24 framework due to shareholder approval requirements timelines.

A review of the incentive arrangements for Enterprise Leaders was also undertaken in FY25. Enterprise Leaders are senior leaders of the business, typically in General Manager or Head Of roles who report to Executives. The long-term incentive plan design for Enterprise Leaders was revised in FY25 to ensure alignment with IFL's FY26-30 strategy and vision. Details of the FY25 plan are disclosed below.

2. Remuneration Framework

2.1 Overview of the Remuneration Framework

The IFL Group's remuneration framework supports each RSE licensee's strategy, risk management and regulatory obligations under CPS 511 and FAR. It links pay to both financial and non-financial performance, encourages responsible risk-taking, and fosters long-term value creation.

The principles below guide how remuneration is applied across the IFL Group. For the RSE licensees, these principles apply specifically to relevant employees who perform significant services for the trustees, ensuring alignment with strategic goals and regulatory standards by rewarding performance and behaviours that contribute to strong risk outcomes.

The principles are to:

- **Support sound governance and risk management** by ensuring remuneration arrangements do not encourage excessive risk-taking or undermine the integrity of financial controls.
- **Promote the best financial interests of members (for the Group's RSE licensees)** by rewarding behaviours and performance that align with the best financial interests of members.
- **Ensure regulatory compliance with CPS 511 and FAR** by applying deferral, clawback, and malus mechanisms to variable remuneration, particularly for Accountable Persons and APRA-specified roles.
- **Attract and retain talent through competitive remuneration structures** that reflect market benchmarks while maintaining alignment with the RSE licensee's strategic and compliance priorities.

Employees within the RSE licensee structure are expected to achieve remuneration objectives through a balanced approach to performance that integrates both financial and non-financial measures. Performance assessments are conducted annually and include:

- Demonstrated adherence to the Group's principles and values.
- Compliance with risk, governance, and accountability obligations.
- Achievement of agreed performance goals that reflect sustainable business outcomes and member-focused service delivery.
- Where applicable, compliance with FAR Accountability Obligations, including acting with integrity and preventing adverse prudential outcomes.

The table below outlines how risk culture is embedded within the remuneration framework and how it directly influences remuneration outcomes.

Element	Summary
Risk Culture	Employees are empowered to manage risk as part of everyday work and are encouraged to ask questions, report concerns, challenge assumptions, and act on issues.
Cultural Integration	Risk culture is reinforced through our cultural principles and embedded in business processes, including the performance framework.
Policy Alignment	The Group Remuneration Policy incentivises responsible behaviour consistent with risk expectations and company values.
Governance and Oversight	The Risk & Conduct Forum oversees material risk-related matters and advises on consequences. Reports are presented to the RSEL Boards, the IFL Board and committees.
Performance Review	Risk assessments are a formal part of CEO and Executive performance reviews, led by the joint meeting of the GPRC, GRCC and GAC with recommendations from the Risk & Conduct Forum.
Remuneration adjustments	The IFL Board and the RSEL Boards may apply positive or negative adjustments to variable remuneration based on consequence outcomes. This includes the ability to reduce, defer, lapse, or cancel awards during or after the performance period.

The consequence management framework, which includes the Consequence Management Policy, the Managing Performance and Conduct Policy, and the Code of Conduct, provides objective guidance on the severity of risk-related matters and consistent oversight of appropriate consequences. It provides the IFL Board and RSEL Boards with a range of mechanisms to adjust remuneration outcomes upwards or downwards to reflect behavioural, risk or compliance outcomes. Within the RSEL Boards' remit, these mechanisms apply only to relevant employees who perform significant services for the RSE licensees (including those in APRA-specified roles under CPS 511), ensuring consequences are applied consistently and in line with prudential standards.

Specified roles under CPS 511 that are external committee members do not receive any variable remuneration. Any material breach, misconduct, or failure to meet risk management standards by these individuals would be assessed under the consequence management framework, with potential consequences including formal censure, removal from the relevant committee, termination of their contract, and reporting to regulators as appropriate.

In-year adjustments
- Determined as part of assessing an individual's performance each year. - The annual assessment includes: consideration of compliance with gateway requirements and with the principle (behavioural) expectations outlined in the Code of Conduct; adherence to IFL policies and risk expectations; mandatory learning and meeting hybrid expectations; and any outcomes from the consequence management process.
Forfeiture
Where an individual's employment is terminated (or they have resigned) due to a compliance or conduct concern, variable reward payments due to be paid and unvested equity are forfeited.
Malus events
- The malus provisions provide the ability to reduce or eliminate in full the retained performance rights offered for all eligible employees. The RSEL Boards and IFL Board on the recommendation of GPRC may adjust or eliminate variable remuneration in response to misconduct, risk management failures, regulatory breaches, underperformance, or non-compliance with conduct and regulatory standards. - Adjustments may be applied at the individual, business unit, or company-wide level. The relevant Board may also extend the deferral period of deferred incentives where threshold standards of conduct or compliance are not met.
Clawback
- Clawback provisions provide the IFL Board and RSEL Boards with the ability to recover in exceptional circumstances (in part or whole) variable remuneration that has already been paid or vested for up to two years from the point of payment or vesting, if it is determined appropriate. - The IFL Board and RSEL Boards have discretion to claw back variable remuneration for at least two years from the date of payment or vesting. - If clawback is applied, participants may be required to repay amounts determined by the IFL Board and RSEL Boards or forfeit some or all of their incentives.

2.2 Specified Roles

The following roles perform work, either wholly or partially, for RSE licensees and are specified roles covered under CPS 511 for FY25 (as of 30 June 2025). Each of the roles specified below are considered as either CEO, Senior Managers or Material Risk Takers under CPS 511.

Executives • CEO – MLC Asset Management • CEO – MLC Expand • CEO – Superannuation • Chief Financial Officer • Chief Legal Officer • Chief Operating Officer • Chief People Officer • Chief Risk Officer • Chief Technology Officer • Group Chief Executive Officer • Group Company Secretary	Enterprise Leaders • Chief Investment Officer • Chief Member Officer • General Manager Financial Crime • General Manager Fund Accounting and Operations • General Manager Internal Audit • General Manager Operational Risk • General Manager Planning & Performance • General Manager Tax • General Manager Technology & Operations – MasterTrust (only for NULIS Nominees (Australia) Limited and OnePath Custodians Pty Limited)
External Committee Members • Insurance and Claims Committee Member • Superannuation Trustee Investment Committee Member	
Risk and Financial Control Personnel • Employees in risk, financial control, compliance, internal audit and actuarial roles.	

2.3 Remuneration structure

This section describes the remuneration structure for APRA-specified roles listed in section 2.2.

The remuneration framework for each cohort of APRA-specified roles is designed to promote prudent risk management, supporting long-term financial soundness, and ensuring appropriate consequences for poor risk outcomes. Each role is subject to tailored remuneration arrangements that reflect the complexity, accountability and risk profile of the position.

External committee members who are identified as APRA Senior Managers are remunerated under separate contractual arrangements, consistent with their governance roles.

2.3.1 Total Fixed Remuneration (TFR)

TFR comprises base remuneration (i.e. cash salary) and superannuation. TFR is delivered in accordance with contractual terms and conditions of employment and is reviewed annually against relevant comparator group remuneration benchmarks to ensure market competitive remuneration for attracting and retaining talent.

2.3.2 Short-term variable remuneration (STVR)

The table below outlines key features of the FY25 STVR award for all APRA-specified roles, except the Chief Investment Officer who is a participant of the Asset Management Incentive Plan (AMIP) as detailed in Section 2.3.3, and external committee members who do not receive variable remuneration.

Feature	Approach
Purpose	Varies annual remuneration outcomes in line with annual performance achievement, with material weighting to financial and non-financial outcomes across member, leadership, strategy execution and shareholder measures, incorporating both risk scorecard and values assessments. Recognises both the “what” and the “how” of performance.
Performance period	Annual in line with the financial year.
Instrument	Executives: 100% of the STVR award is delivered in cash. For FY25 the CEO – Superannuation is an exception to this as a portion of his STVR outcome is deferred into Restricted Rights.¹ Enterprise Leaders: depending on total variable remuneration, a portion of the STVR outcome may be deferred into Restricted Rights, which are subject to vesting conditions that include risk and conduct requirements and may be reduced or forfeited under malus provisions.

¹ The CEO – Superannuation's total variable remuneration for FY25 includes a deferred one-off amount as payment for incentives foregone as part of his commencement in the role. To ensure CPS 511 deferral requirements are met, a portion of the STVR outcome is deferred into Restricted rights that will vest equally on 30 June 2028, 30 June 2029 and 30 June 2030 subject to continued risk and conduct requirements and malus provisions.

Feature	Approach
Performance Measures and Weightings	Executives: STVR outcomes are determined with reference to Group performance and individual performance through a balanced scorecard. The performance measures comprise a mix of financial and non-financial metrics linked to Group and business unit targets, aligned to the Group's strategy with the weightings varied by role. STVR outcomes are subject to discretion by the IFL Board and RSEL Boards. Enterprise Leaders: receive STVR under a discretionary framework, with the assessment of performance measures that comprise both financial and non-financial goals which vary by role. While internal guideline targets exist, the final outcome remains discretionary. From 1 July 2025, this will transition to a structured STVR model with defined targets, aligning with CPS 511's expectations for clarity and consistency in remuneration arrangements. Risk and Financial Control Personnel: assessed primarily on non-financial measures, reflecting their independent oversight roles. Their STVR is not influenced by the financial performance of the business units they oversee, in line with CPS 511's requirement that remuneration for control functions must reflect independence and not be unduly influenced by business performance. For 2025, short-term incentive outcomes for risk and financial control personnel was an average of 11% of total fixed remuneration. The IFL Board has full discretion to adjust or withhold performance-based funding for the incentive pool based on financial, non-financial, and reputational factors, regardless of initial assessments. Performance measures may influence funding levels, but the IFL Board retains final discretion regarding the determination of organisational performance and final funding for the pool.
Risk and Conduct and Principles	Performance outcomes are subject to the following non-financial gateways and modifiers: • Compliance gateways: all relevant individuals must meet core compliance expectations to be eligible for a STVR outcome, including adherence to the Code of Conduct and completion of mandatory training requirements. • Principles: the IFL Board and RSEL Boards have discretion to adjust STVR outcomes on the basis of an assessment of behaviours aligned with Group principles, where appropriate. Risk-related matters: the IFL Board and RSEL Boards have discretion, where appropriate, to adjust STVR outcomes based on individual risk performance and conduct, including where informed by recommendations from the Risk & Conduct Forum in relation to risk-related matters. The Risk and Conduct modifier also includes consideration of the senior risk-related matter outcomes that may warrant an adjustment to the Risk and Conduct assessment.
Deferral	For FY25, the following deferrals apply: • The Group CEO is subject to a 1-year deferral on 50% of his STVR outcome. • A portion of the CEO – Superannuation's STVR outcome is deferred into Restricted Rights for up to 6 years (measured from the beginning of the performance period). Enterprise Leaders who are senior managers under CPS 511 and meet the deferral threshold have a portion of their STVR outcome deferred into Restricted Rights for up to 5 years (measured from the beginning of the performance period).

2.3.3 Asset Management Incentive Plan

The AMIP is a specialist incentive plan which is designed to reward participants for delivery of annual goals that drive long-term sustainable performance. Any outcome is delivered in cash following the end of the performance period. Due to the specialist nature of his role, the Chief Investment Officer is a participant in the AMIP rather than the STVR.

The plan provides an appropriate level of remuneration that varies based on the IFL Board and RSEL Boards' determination of participants' performance for the year which is measured against agreed targets for financial and non-financial measures that deliver strategic objectives. Participants are subject to minimum performance requirements for consideration for an AMIP award.

The AMIP pool is allocated to participants at the discretion of the Chief Asset Management Officer and subject to Group CEO and IFL Board approval, taking into account individual performance, contribution to Asset Management outcomes, risk outcomes and the values and behaviours demonstrated by participants.

For FY25, 40% of the Chief Investment Officer's AMIP outcome is subject to deferral for up to 5 years (measured from the beginning of the performance period).

2.3.4 Long-term variable remuneration (LTVR)

The table below outlines key features of the FY25 LTVR for Executives and other senior managers, other than the Chief Investment Officer who is not eligible for LTVR and external committee members who do not receive variable remuneration. A small number of risk and financial control personnel who are part of the Executive and Enterprise Leader cohort are eligible to participate in the LTVR.

The FY25 executive remuneration framework introduces an LTVR Deferred component (along with a LTVR Fixed component) which is designed to ensure executives meet the deferral requirements under CPS 511. The LTVR Deferred component is adjusted following the end of the performance year based on the individual's STVR outcome, such that LTVR Deferred always remains at 40% (60% for CEO roles) of total variable remuneration for the year, as described in the table below.

Feature	Approach
Purpose	Varies remuneration outcomes in line with longer term performance achievement, with a focus on relative shareholder returns to support sustainable shareholder value over time.
Instrument	Performance rights – each right entitles the participant to receive one IFL share (or cash equivalent at the IFL Board's discretion), subject to vesting conditions.
Opportunity	For FY25, Executives (apart from the Group CEO ²) participate in the Executive LTVR plan, which is comprised of LTVR Fixed and LTVR Deferred. The LTVR Fixed component is a fixed opportunity, whereas the LTVR Deferred component is granted at target opportunity but can decrease or increase (up to the maximum opportunity) once STVR outcomes are known after the end of the performance year. This is designed to ensure the LTVR Deferred component remains at 40% of total variable remuneration (60% for CEO roles) to meet deferral requirements under CPS 511. Other eligible Senior Managers receive only a fixed LTVR opportunity as a percentage of their TFR.
Performance Period	Three years from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2027.
Performance measures / weightings	70% subject to relative Total Shareholder Return (rTSR) performance 30% subject to Reputational performance.
Restricted period	Group CEO: 50% of vested performance rights are restricted until 30 June 2029, and 50% until 30 June 2030. LTVR Deferred performance rights for Executives are subject to a restricted period as follows: • CEO – Superannuation, CEO – MLC Expand: 33.3% restricted until each of 30 June 2028, 30 June 2029, and 30 June 2030 • Other Executives: 50% restricted until each of 30 June 2028 and 30 June 2029. After the restricted period, vested performance rights will be exercised and converted to IFL shares.
LTVR Deferred adjustment based on STVR outcome	For Executives (excluding Group CEO): following assessment of STVR outcomes at the end of the performance year, the LTVR Deferred portion will be adjusted to ensure that LTVR Deferred is 40% (60% for CEO – Superannuation and CEO – MLC Expand) of total variable remuneration to align with CPS 511 deferral requirements: • Where the STVR outcome is below target, the relevant portion of LTVR Deferred performance rights will lapse. • Where the STVR outcome exceeds target, an additional relevant portion of LTVR Deferred performance rights will be granted.

² The Group CEO received an allocation of performance rights under the previous executive incentive plan structure (as described throughout this section) due to timing of shareholder approval, and as such does not have an LTVR Deferred component.

Feature	Approach										
Performance measures	Relative TSR (70% of target) Relative TSR compares the ranking of IFL's TSR over the performance period with the TSR of a peer group of companies comprised of the ASX200 (excluding mining and resources companies).										
	<table><tr><th>Peer group ranking</th><th>Proportion of performance rights vesting</th></tr><tr><td>At the 75th percentile or higher</td><td>100%</td></tr><tr><td>Between the median and 75th percentile</td><td>Pro-rata vesting from 50% to 100%</td></tr><tr><td>At the median</td><td>50%</td></tr><tr><td>Below the median</td><td>0%</td></tr></table>	Peer group ranking	Proportion of performance rights vesting	At the 75th percentile or higher	100%	Between the median and 75th percentile	Pro-rata vesting from 50% to 100%	At the median	50%	Below the median	0%
	Peer group ranking	Proportion of performance rights vesting									
	At the 75th percentile or higher	100%									
	Between the median and 75th percentile	Pro-rata vesting from 50% to 100%									
	At the median	50%									
	Below the median	0%									
	Reputational (30% of target) The Reputational component sits as the non-financial element of the LTVR and measures the reputation of the MLC brand as IFL's primary consumer brand. Reputation is measured using data from RepTrak. The final Reputational Score will be calculated using the average of the quarterly scores of the last 12 months of the performance period, compared to baseline score at the commencement of the performance period of 68.4%.										
	<table><tr><th>Reputational Score</th><th>Proportion of performance rights vesting</th></tr><tr><td>Reputational Score of 74%</td><td>100%</td></tr><tr><td>Reputational Score between 70% and 74%</td><td>Pro-rata vesting from 50% to 100%</td></tr><tr><td>Reputational Score of 70%</td><td>50%</td></tr><tr><td>Reputational Score below 70%</td><td>0%</td></tr></table>	Reputational Score	Proportion of performance rights vesting	Reputational Score of 74%	100%	Reputational Score between 70% and 74%	Pro-rata vesting from 50% to 100%	Reputational Score of 70%	50%	Reputational Score below 70%	0%
	Reputational Score	Proportion of performance rights vesting									
Reputational Score of 74%	100%										
Reputational Score between 70% and 74%	Pro-rata vesting from 50% to 100%										
Reputational Score of 70%	50%										
Reputational Score below 70%	0%										

Quantitative Disclosure

The following quantitative disclosures have been prepared in accordance with CPS 511 for the financial year ended 30 June 2025.

The amounts disclosed in this section of the report have been calculated on an apportionment basis across the RSE licensees of the IFL Group, using the following methodology:

- Time committed to RSE licensees for each role; and
- The funds under administration (FUA) of the relevant RSE licensee, as a percentage of the total FUA of all the RSE licensees within the Group.

Remuneration disclosures – IOOF Investment Management Limited

Remuneration outcomes for the financial year

	A\$m	CEO	Other senior managers	Highly paid material risk-takers	Other material risk-takers
Fixed remuneration					
1	Number of employees paid fixed remuneration	3	18	–	–
2	Total fixed remuneration	0.343	0.972	–	–
3	of which: cash-based awards	0.343	0.972	–	–
4	of which: share-based	–	–	–	–
5	of which: other	–	–	–	–
6	Average percentage increase in total fixed remuneration (row 2) on previous financial year ³	n/a			
Variable remuneration					
7	Number of employees eligible for variable remuneration	3	16	–	–
8	Number of employees that received variable remuneration	3	16	–	–
9	Total variable remuneration	1.116	1.060	–	–
10	of which: cash-based	0.216	0.412	–	–
11	of which: share-based awards	0.900	0.648	–	–
12	of which: other	–	–	–	–
13	Total variable remuneration (row 9) that has been deferred	0.918	0.648	–	–
14	of which: cash-based	0.018	–	–	–
15	of which: share-based awards	0.900	0.648	–	–
16	of which: other	–	–	–	–
17	Average percentage increase in total variable remuneration (row 9) on previous financial year ⁶	n/a			
18	Total remuneration (sum of rows 2 + 9)	1.459	2.032	–	–

³ As 2025 is the first year of remuneration disclosures for IOOF Investment Management Limited, there is no comparative information disclosed for the prior year. This information will be included as of the 2026 remuneration disclosure.

Special payments

	A\$m	CEO	Other senior managers	Highly paid material risk-takers	Other material risk-takers
1	Number of employees paid a guaranteed bonus	-	-	-	-
2	Total guaranteed bonuses	-	-	-	-
3	Number of employees paid a sign-on award	1	-	-	-
4	Total sign-on awards	0.091	-	-	-
5	Number of employees paid a severance payment	-	-	-	-
6	Total severance payments	-	-	-	-

Deferred and adjusted variable remuneration

	A\$m	A Total amount of outstanding deferred variable remuneration post adjustments	B Total amount of variable remuneration not deferred post adjustments	C Total amount of downward adjustments to variable remuneration reported in columns A and B
CEO				
1	Total CEO	0.939	0.198	-
2	of which: cash-based	0.018	0.198	-
3	of which: share-based awards	0.921	-	-
4	of which: other	-	-	-
Other senior managers				
5	Total other senior managers	1.036	0.412	-
6	of which: cash-based	-	0.412	-
7	of which: share-based awards	1.036	-	-
8	of which: other	-	-	-
Highly paid material-risk takers				
9	Total highly paid material risk-takers	-	-	-
10	of which: cash-based	-	-	-
11	of which: share-based awards	-	-	-
12	of which: other	-	-	-
Other material risk-takers				
13	Total other material risk-takers	-	-	-
14	of which: cash-based	-	-	-
15	of which: share-based awards	-	-	-
16	of which: other	-	-	-
17	Total (sum of rows 9 + 13)	1.975	0.610	-

Remuneration disclosures – NULIS Nominees (Australia) Limited

Remuneration outcomes for the financial year

	A\$m	CEO	Other senior managers	Highly paid material risk-takers	Other material risk-takers
Fixed remuneration					
1	Number of employees paid fixed remuneration	3	19	–	–
2	Total fixed remuneration	0.442	1.273	–	–
3	of which: cash-based awards	0.442	1.273	–	–
4	of which: share-based	–	–	–	–
5	of which: other	–	–	–	–
6	Average percentage increase in total fixed remuneration (row 2) on previous financial year ⁴	n/a			
Variable remuneration					
7	Number of employees eligible for variable remuneration	3	17	–	–
8	Number of employees that received variable remuneration	3	17	–	–
9	Total variable remuneration	1.437	1.381	–	–
10	of which: cash-based	0.278	0.535	–	–
11	of which: share-based awards	1.159	0.846	–	–
12	of which: other	–	–	–	–
13	Total variable remuneration (row 9) that has been deferred	1.182	0.846	–	–
14	of which: cash-based	0.023	–	–	–
15	of which: share-based awards	1.159	0.846	–	–
16	of which: other	–	–	–	–
17	Average percentage increase in total variable remuneration (row 9) on previous financial year ⁶	n/a			
18	Total remuneration (sum of rows 2 + 9)	1.879	2.654	–	–

Special payments

	A\$m	CEO	Other senior managers	Highly paid material risk-takers	Other material risk-takers
1	Number of employees paid a guaranteed bonus	–	–	–	–
2	Total guaranteed bonuses	–	–	–	–
3	Number of employees paid a sign-on award	1	–	–	–
4	Total sign-on awards	0.117	–	–	–
5	Number of employees paid a severance payment	–	–	–	–
6	Total severance payments	–	–	–	–

4 As 2025 is the first year of remuneration disclosures for NULIS Nominees (Australia) Limited, there is no comparative information disclosed for the prior year. This information will be included as of the 2026 remuneration disclosure.

Deferred and adjusted variable remuneration

	A\$m	A Total amount of outstanding deferred variable remuneration post adjustments	B Total amount of variable remuneration not deferred post adjustments	C Total amount of downward adjustments to variable remuneration reported in columns A and B
CEO				
1	Total CEO	1.209	0.255	-
2	of which: cash-based	0.023	0.255	-
3	of which: share-based awards	1.186	-	-
4	of which: other	-	-	-
Other senior managers				
5	Total other senior managers	1.353	0.535	-
6	of which: cash-based	-	0.535	-
7	of which: share-based awards	1.353	-	-
8	of which: other	-	-	-
Highly paid material-risk takers				
9	Total highly paid material risk-takers	-	-	-
10	of which: cash-based	-	-	-
11	of which: share-based awards	-	-	-
12	of which: other	-	-	-
Other material risk-takers				
13	Total other material risk-takers	-	-	-
14	of which: cash-based	-	-	-
15	of which: share-based awards	-	-	-
16	of which: other	-	-	-
17	Total (sum of rows 9 + 13)	2.562	0.790	-

Remuneration disclosures – OnePath Custodians Pty Limited

Remuneration outcomes for the financial year

	A\$m	CEO	Other senior managers	Highly paid material risk-takers	Other material risk-takers
Fixed remuneration					
1	Number of employees paid fixed remuneration	3	19	–	–
2	Total fixed remuneration	0.189	0.543	–	–
3	of which: cash-based awards	0.189	0.543	–	–
4	of which: share-based	–	–	–	–
5	of which: other	–	–	–	–
6	Average percentage increase in total fixed remuneration (row 2) on previous financial year ⁵	n/a			
Variable remuneration					
7	Number of employees eligible for variable remuneration	3	17	–	–
8	Number of employees that received variable remuneration	3	17	–	–
9	Total variable remuneration	0.614	0.589	–	–
10	of which: cash-based	0.119	0.228	–	–
11	of which: share-based awards	0.495	0.361	–	–
12	of which: other	–	–	–	–
13	Total variable remuneration (row 9) that has been deferred	0.505	0.361	–	–
14	of which: cash-based	0.010	–	–	–
15	of which: share-based awards	0.495	0.361	–	–
16	of which: other	–	–	–	–
17	Average percentage increase in total variable remuneration (row 9) on previous financial year ⁶	n/a			
18	Total remuneration (sum of rows 2 + 9)	0.803	1.132	–	–

5 As 2025 is the first year of remuneration disclosures for OnePath Custodians Pty Limited, there is no comparative information disclosed for the prior year. This information will be included as of the 2026 remuneration disclosure.

Special payments

	A\$m	CEO	Other senior managers	Highly paid material risk-takers	Other material risk-takers
1	Number of employees paid a guaranteed bonus	-	-	-	-
2	Total guaranteed bonuses	-	-	-	-
3	Number of employees paid a sign-on award	1	-	-	-
4	Total sign-on awards	0.050	-	-	-
5	Number of employees paid a severance payment	-	-	-	-
6	Total severance payments	-	-	-	-

Deferred and adjusted variable remuneration

	A\$m	A Total amount of outstanding deferred variable remuneration post adjustments	B Total amount of variable remuneration not deferred post adjustments	C Total amount of downward adjustments to variable remuneration reported in columns A and B
CEO				
1	Total CEO	0.516	0.109	-
2	of which: cash-based	0.010	0.109	-
3	of which: share-based awards	0.506	-	-
4	of which: other	-	-	-
Other senior managers				
5	Total other senior managers	0.577	0.228	-
6	of which: cash-based	-	0.228	-
7	of which: share-based awards	0.577	-	-
8	of which: other	-	-	-
Highly paid material-risk takers				
9	Total highly paid material risk-takers	-	-	-
10	of which: cash-based	-	-	-
11	of which: share-based awards	-	-	-
12	of which: other	-	-	-
Other material risk-takers				
13	Total other material risk-takers	-	-	-
14	of which: cash-based	-	-	-
15	of which: share-based awards	-	-	-
16	of which: other	-	-	-
17	Total (sum of rows 9 + 13)	1.093	0.337	-

Remuneration disclosures – Oasis Fund Management Limited

Remuneration outcomes for the financial year

	A\$m	CEO	Other senior managers	Highly paid material risk-takers	Other material risk-takers
Fixed remuneration					
1	Number of employees paid fixed remuneration	3	18	–	–
2	Total fixed remuneration	0.013	0.036	–	–
3	of which: cash-based awards	0.013	0.036	–	–
4	of which: share-based	–	–	–	–
5	of which: other	–	–	–	–
6	Average percentage increase in total fixed remuneration (row 2) on previous financial year ⁶	n/a			
Variable remuneration					
7	Number of employees eligible for variable remuneration	3	16	–	–
8	Number of employees that received variable remuneration	3	16	–	–
9	Total variable remuneration	0.041	0.039	–	–
10	of which: cash-based	0.008	0.015	–	–
11	of which: share-based awards	0.033	0.024	–	–
12	of which: other	–	–	–	–
13	Total variable remuneration (row 9) that has been deferred	0.034	0.024	–	–
14	of which: cash-based	0.001	–	–	–
15	of which: share-based awards	0.033	0.024	–	–
16	of which: other	–	–	–	–
17	Average percentage increase in total variable remuneration (row 9) on previous financial year ⁶	n/a			
18	Total remuneration (sum of rows 2 + 9)	0.054	0.075	–	–

Special payments

	A\$m	CEO	Other senior managers	Highly paid material risk-takers	Other material risk-takers
1	Number of employees paid a guaranteed bonus	–	–	–	–
2	Total guaranteed bonuses	–	–	–	–
3	Number of employees paid a sign-on award	1	–	–	–
4	Total sign-on awards	0.003	–	–	–
5	Number of employees paid a severance payment	–	–	–	–
6	Total severance payments	–	–	–	–

⁶ As 2025 is the first year of remuneration disclosures for Oasis Fund Management Limited, there is no comparative information disclosed for the prior year. This information will be included as of the 2026 remuneration disclosure.

Deferred and adjusted variable remuneration

	A\$m	A Total amount of outstanding deferred variable remuneration post adjustments	B Total amount of variable remuneration not deferred post adjustments	C Total amount of downward adjustments to variable remuneration reported in columns A and B
CEO				
1	Total CEO	0.035	0.007	-
2	of which: cash-based	0.001	0.007	-
3	of which: share-based awards	0.034	-	-
4	of which: other	-	-	-
Other senior managers				
5	Total other senior managers	0.038	0.015	-
6	of which: cash-based	-	0.015	-
7	of which: share-based awards	0.038	-	-
8	of which: other	-	-	-
Highly paid material-risk takers				
9	Total highly paid material risk-takers	-	-	-
10	of which: cash-based	-	-	-
11	of which: share-based awards	-	-	-
12	of which: other	-	-	-
Other material risk-takers				
13	Total other material risk-takers	-	-	-
14	of which: cash-based	-	-	-
15	of which: share-based awards	-	-	-
16	of which: other	-	-	-
17	Total (sum of rows 9 + 13)	0.073	0.022	-